2016年4月29日 星期五

PTAB與法院審查標準討論 - Merck & Cie v. Gnosis (Fed. Cir. 2016)

前言:
美國專利IPR, PGR等異議制度的嚴格條件如同美國法院訴訟,除了在程序上"刁難"外,更在事實認定上使用「優勢證據」的標準。於是,相關上訴案件法院就謹守「實質證據審查標準」,而不會一味地採用「clear error」標準。

CAFC執行「實質證據審查標準(substantial evidence standard of review)」是與最高法院判例Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999)有關,另有CAFC案例In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000)支持PTAB在審查案件時,事實認定上也採用「實質證據審查標準」。


Merck & Cie v. Gnosis (Fed. Cir. 2016)案件資訊:
上訴人/專利權人:MERCK & CIE
被上訴人:GNOSIS S.P.A., GNOSIS BIORESEARCH S.A., GNOSIS U.S.A., INC.
上訴PTAB案件:IPR2013-00117
系爭專利:US 6,011,040

緣起:PTAB採用「實質證據審查標準」在IPR程序中認為系爭專利為顯而易見而裁定無效,對此裁決,原專利權人提出上訴,要求CAFC聯席法官重審,然而,CAFC法官的意思是,在法院的立場無法改變PTAB的審查標準。

案件討論:
CAFC採用的前例為美國最高法院Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999),在此判例之前,法院在"可專利性"的事實認定上採用「明顯的錯誤(clear error)」,但在Zurko案例中,最高法院否決過去的標準,而回歸到「5 U.S.C. § 706」,當中提出兩種法院審理案件的態度:(1)arbitrary capricious; (2)substantial evidence。顯然前者是法院應該要找出的違法缺失,後者則是對於事實認定的審查標準。


[法條參考]
5 U.S.C. § 706
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall—
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

法院也搬出支持本次判決的法規,認為法院審理美國專利局案件時,應基於專利局的記錄,也就事實質討論所提出的證據。


AIA在立法時,提出的幾種異議程序,立法國要求PTAB審理時要判斷請願人是否符合「提出優勢證據」的責任的規定「(burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence)」,因此,在IPR審理時十分嚴格,確認證據力後才會同意進入啟始程序。
"The AIA directs the Board to determine whether a petitioner in an IPR proceeding has met its “burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”"

[參考法條]
35 U.S.C. 316    CONDUCT OF INTER PARTES REVIEW.
...
(e) EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS.—In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

CAFC最終態度:
"Unless and until Congress or the Supreme Court sees fit to change our standard of review expressly, we must continue to review factual findings of the Board for substantial evidence."

本案結論:因為IPR的嚴格條件,CAFC沒有理由不支持PTAB的事實認定標準,因此CAFC否決專利權人提出重審的要求。

my two cents:
另有本次CAFC認為事實認定應該是採用「實質證據審查標準」的理由是,在Zurko案中,美國最高法院將「clear error(明顯錯誤)」審理標準視為「法院對法院(court/court)」的審查標準,白話講就是在訴訟中挑錯誤!但在其他等級的審理標準則是如APA(行政程序法)的「法院對民間(court/agency)」的標準。(編按,這樣的意思是,專利有效性的訴訟應該是court/agency等級)

其實當中有許多法院見解與原理是我無法理解的,還有很多議題尚待研究。

專利訴訟中的「事實認定」,包括有效性,顯然法院認為應該與USPTO、PTAB用一致標準,就是「實質證據審查標準」,也因為類訴訟(trial-like)的IPR程序走向訴訟的程序與標準,這個相對客觀與一致的標準也被法院認同。而在「實質證據審查標準」下,提出IPR的一方嚴格遵守程序與找到好的證據,也使得無效率提高很多。

判決原文:http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-1779.Order.4-22-2016.1.PDF
判決備份:https://app.box.com/s/r0ugo90r8flszjpgmgoasea79ky8v6m3

資料參考:http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/circuit-deference-decisions.html

Ron

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